The Psychology of Aggression and the Ugliness of the Health Care Reform Debate

March 23rd, 2010 by Ravi Iyer

Most people are not violent people. From an evolutionary perspective, there are high costs involved for a member of a species to kill other members of it’s own species. Soldiers in war have to be trained out of their natural impulse not to fire weapons. For the vast majority of people, aggression is a last resort and I’m guessing that most readers have anecdotal evidence of this as rarely do everyday disagreements escalate into physical or even direct verbal attacks. It’s usually not worth the risk and stress to our systems.

There is lots of psychological research on how to reduce these inhibitions (e.g. dehumanization, Milgram’s obedience studies), but there is little research (feel free to let me know if I’m wrong about this and I’ll edit this) on the positive pressures towards aggression. Among the ideas I am familiar with are Sherif’s classic studies on competition for limited resources, which are echoed in Robert Wrights’s ideas about zero-sum competitions leading to conflict. However, competition itself is just a circumstance and it doesn’t necessarily get at the psychological mechanism for group level aggression. For example, people may compete because they covet a particular resource or they may compete because they need that resource to survive.

A couple years ago, I hypothesized that individuals are moved to aggression because of an excess of moral principle, rather than the absence of moral principle. In the context of the health care reform debate, this may mean harming others “for the greater good”, which could be defined as saving unborn fetuses, providing health care to the sick, defending the constitution, fighting for liberty, or an assortment of other moral principles which have been asserted by both sides as justifying actions that might normally be considered out of bounds. In the past few days, we have seen gun threats, windows broken, the elderly disrespected, and slurs and spit hurled at politicians. These incidences of crossing boundaries in the name of a cause are not limited to one party as those in favor of health care have harassed Bart Stupak and tried to have Joe Lieberman’s wife fired. No side has a monopoly on the ugliness.

I don’t have data that speaks directly to this question, but I do have this graph to consider. At the time that I started thinking about what I call ‘hypermoralism’, I created a small educational website that I thought I’d use to gather some exploratory data as I thought about these issues. The website is still in beta but the results of the initial survey are interesting. I asked people to think of a group that committed violence against civilians (e.g. 30% picked the Nazis) and think of the motivations behind that violence. I then asked people to think of reasons why, in an extreme case, they themselves might endorse violence against civilians.

Reasons to support violence against civilians

As you can see in the above graph, people believe that notorious groups that kill civilians are amoral (“They were amoral, having no moral standards.” or “They were seeking personal gain at the expense of others.”) most of all and were willing to entertain the idea that they were hypermoral (“They were killing people who belong to a specific group to avenge a past injustice committed by other members of that group.”) as that value was still close to the midpoint of the scale. Survival (“They were killing people because they themselves would be killed if they did not.”) was a distant third motivation.

In contrast, when people considered when they would potentially resort to violence against civilians, survival (of both the individual and the family, which loaded on the same factor in a factor analysis) was the prime potential motivator. Unfortunately, for my hypothesis, moral reasons were deemed no more likely than non-moral reasons for individuals, but I still think there is something to be learned.

Clearly, these scenarios are not directly comparable as the average respondent is likely actually different than the average Nazi or member of the Khmer Rouge. It’s not just a matter of perception. But if we believe in the vast amount of research on the fundamental attribution error, which shows that we underestimate situational pressure when others do bad things, there likely is some amount of attribution error occurring in this instance. It seems likely that many individuals within these notorious groups actually did feel some survival motivation that spurred their actions. For example, Hitler was quite poor, though clearly his actions went way beyond mere survival.

In the health care reform debate, it seems that a precursor to the ugliness is indeed couching the debate in terms of a life or death struggle for survival, justifying questionable behavior.  Is America hanging by a thread? Then I suppose it’s worth taking extreme measures to save it. Are people dying every day that reform isn’t enacted? Then I suppose a few harassing calls to a congressman’s home are a small price to pay.

Politics in America can often be a zero-sum game and it is inevitable that passions will be inflamed on both sides. Liberals may have ‘won’ this vote, but we all lose when the debate gets too ugly and liberals are just as guilty of exaggeration when things don’t go their way. Indeed, I just received an email asking for help to “stop big corporations from taking over our democracy”, a reference to a recent Supreme Court decision which conservatives “won”. Such rhetorical devices may be useful, but we should all guard against where such exaggeration inevitably leads….ugliness.

– Ravi Iyer

Posted in aggression, civil politics, health care, health care reform, healthcare, hypermoralism, political psychology, yourmorals.org, zero sum | 4 Comments »

Nationally Representative Data is (sometimes) Bad Data for Psychology

March 9th, 2010 by Jonathan Haidt

We psychologists hit a wall when we try to publish in sociology or political science journals: Our data is almost never obtained from nationally representative samples. We usually obtain convenience samples, either of undergraduate students at our universities, or from visitors to a website (such as YourMorals.org). These two methods invariably produce samples that are much better educated than would be obtained from nationally representative samples such as those used by the major polling organizations. Sociologists and political scientists therefore think that our findings are ungeneralizable and useless.

But the truth is more complex, and in some ways, our data is better than theirs. In an article just published in Public Opinion Quarterly, Linchiat Chang and Jon Krosnick report the results of a national field experiment in which they collected responses to a complex survey on political knowledge and voting behavior using three parallel methods:

  1. Representative-Telephone: They used Random Digit Dialing to obtain a nationally representative sample, which was then interviewed by a live interviewer (this was supposedly the gold standard)
  2. Representative-Internet: They hired Knowledge Networks to administer the survey. KN has painstakingly assembled a panel of  people that is more or less nationally representative.  Many of these people were given free Web-TV to allow them to connect to the internet.  They are paid to respond to specific studies that they do not select.
  3. Volunteer-Internet: They used a collection of volunteers who had signed up with the Harris Poll Online in response to advertisements on the search engine Excite.com. Harris then emailed invitations to a subset of these volunteers in an effort to approach representativeness by age, sex, and region of the country, but because each person chooses whether to respond to each invitation, based on its content, the final sample was not at all representative.

Chang and Krosnick found–not surprisingly–that methods 1 and 2 yielded data that was more representative of the US population than did method #3. So if what you really need to know is the percentage of Americans who believe X, then you should do your darndest to assemble a nationally representative sample.

But psychologists rarely want to know the percentage of Americans who believe X. We’re trying to figure out how minds work, particularly different kinds of minds, or minds that have just been exposed to different primes or procedures. We need participants who can read and understand directions and then answer questions honestly and thoughtfully. Chang and Krosnick found that the Volunteer-Internet method yielded the highest quality data.

Data collected by telephone was the lowest quality data: these participants showed more random measurement error, more survey satisficing (just giving any answer to keep moving), and more social desirability bias (because they were talking to a live person).

Data collected by internet was much better: the internet has so many advantages over the telephone, such as the fact that people can see the questions and response choices — they don’t have to hold it all in their heads, as in a telephone survey. But the best data of all came from the Volunteer-Internet sample–lowest rates of random error and satisficing–because they were, on average more interested in the topic, more motivated to do a good job, more experienced with internet usage and web surveys, and (most likely) somewhat smarter than the Representative-Internet population.

And here’s another problem with probability samples: they are so expensive to obtain that the sample sizes are usually not very large– typically just one or two thousand–and the researcher is usually forced to use very short instruments, often just a single item, to measure the key constructs. In contrast, on a volunteer site such as YourMorals.org, where people come because they are interested, we can use much longer and better instruments, and we can collect data from tens of thousands of people.

The bottom line is that each method of data collection has advantages and disadvantages. There are times when psychologists want to know the percent of Americans who believe X (as in a survey about explicit attitudes about affirmative action); in such cases they should try to obtain a representative sample. But in the great majority of cases our questions are different. If we want to know how explicit attitudes about race relate to implicit attitudes, we’re asking a question about mental mechanisms, not about population distributions. We’re probably better off using a Volunteer-Internet sample, such as YourMorals.org, or ProjectImplicit.org.

Of course, generalizability matters. If we’re going to make claims about differences between liberals and conservatives from data collected at YourMorals, then we’ve got to be confident that those claims will generalize to liberals and conservatives more broadly. One simple way we do this is to track participants by the site that referred them to YourMorals. If our results hold up for people who came from a social conservative site, a libertarian site, a scientist’s site, and a mainstream media site, then we have good reason to believe that they will generalize quite broadly. (Ravi Iyer has done such an analysis, and demonstrated robustness across referral sites.)

A second method of establishing generalizability is to attempt to replicate our findings in a nationally representative sample. However, such replication may be prohibitively expensive (if the task takes more than 10 minutes), and a failure to replicate would be inconclusive (it may simply be a Type-II error due to the lower interest, motivation, or ability of the participants. The effect might still be generalizable, it just can’t be found in lower-quality data).

There’s an old saw in the social sciences: Psychologists can’t sample, sociologists can’t measure. Both skills are valuable, but for psychologists, good measurement is usually more important than good sampling.

Posted in yourmorals.org | 9 Comments »
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Does trait anxiety make your more or less likely to support war?

March 3rd, 2010 by Ravi Iyer

Recently, one of the grad students in my department gave a brownbag talk about the relationship between fear and aggression.  On the one hand, one might expect fear to lead to aggression as one perceives threat to a greater extent and responds accordingly.  On the other hand, fear is associated with withdrawal and so we may expect those who are naturally fearful to avoid aggressive actions, such as war.

I analyzed data on our support for war and peace measure (e.g. “War is sometimes the best way to solve a conflict” – Van der Linden et. al 2008) as well as a measure of trait anxiety (e.g. how accurately “get stressed out easily” describes you – from the IPPI BIS/BAS scale).  Unfortunately, the analysis I ran isn’t particularly conclusive, but part of science is hopefully sharing both conclusive and inconclusive results so that others can build on it.  There is a small significant negative correlation (r=-.166, p<.001) between trait anxiety and support for war.  From the below graph, this relationship appears strongest in moderates (perhaps because they have made up their minds less about war/peace), but is consistent across groups except libertarians.

Trait Fear/Anxiety and War/Aggression support

The straight lines above are linear relationships and the curvy lines are if we allow SPSS to fit a curvy line to the data.  There is a semi-consistent result, but the slopes certainly aren’t dramatic.  I also ran the analysis for Big 5 Neuroticism and the correlation between that and support for war was even smaller (r=-.052) though still negative and significant (p=.004 since there were 3,041 participants vs. 604 in the above graph).

The take home message?  I would say that it seems likely that there is an overall slightly negative relationship between general anxiety and general support for war.  However, it seems likely (and consistent with previous research) that in a specifically threatening situation, the results might be quite different as the chronically stressed individual might perceive much greater threat and therefore support war in specific threatening cases to a greater degree than a less anxious individual.  I hope to have more to report on this in the future as to what these cases look like and I’d welcome any comments pointing to other relevant research as it’s something I’m learning about.

– Ravi Iyer

Posted in aggression, big 5, neuroticism, political psychology, trait anxiety, War and Peace, yourmorals.org | 1 Comment »

In Search of Liberal Purity

February 22nd, 2010 by Jonathan Haidt

At Yourmorals.org we have always found that scores on the Purity/sanctity foundation are higher on the political right than on the left. Conservatives, particularly religious conservatives, live in a more sacralized world. Liberals, particularly secular scientifically-minded liberals, live in a more materialist, un-magical world.

Yet there are enough hints of “liberal purity” scattered about that we at Yourmorals are actively trying to measure it. (You might want to take our survey, here, before you read any further. You’ll have to register or sign in along the way). It can be seen in the liberal tendency to moralize food and eating, beyond its nutritive/material aspects. (See this fabulous essay by Mary Eberstadt comparing the way the left moralizes food and the right moralizes sex). It can be seen in the way the left treats environmental issues and the natural world as something sacred, to be cared for above and beyond its consequences for human – or even animal—welfare. So how do we define purity/sanctity in a way that can capture the purity concerns of both left and right?

Consider this famous quote from William James’s Varieties of Religious Experience:

Religion “consists of the belief that there is an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto.”

So as long as you act as though there is an unseen order which imposes moral obligations and limitations on human actions above and beyond the consequences that those actions have for other people (or perhaps animals), then we are in the realm of religion or quasi-religion, and potentially in the realm of sanctity and sacred order.

Now consider this famous quote from Leon Kass, widely considered to be a conservative bioethicist (but who in fact is a complex, non-religious intellectual who believes that religions contain useful wisdom):

Shallow are the souls that have forgotten how to shudder. [from “The Wisdom of Repugnance,” reprinted here]

Kass’s argument is that our feelings of disgust toward cloning and other biomedical technologies should be attended to. They may not be decisive, but disgust is often a warning, a useful brake on the otherwise headlong rush into any sort of technology whose benefits (in a purely utilitarian calculation) outweigh its costs. Kass is an eloquent spokesman for the Purity/sanctity foundation as it is used on the right, even for those who don’t believe in God.

But now consider this quote, from E. O. Wilson:

We descend farther from heaven’s air if we forget how much the natural world means to us.

Might this be the key to understanding how the Left understands environmental issues in part using the Purity/sanctity foundation? Might nature and the natural world provide the “unseen order” that can act as a brake on capitalism, greed, and the headlong rush into consumerism, self-indulgence, and waste that has offended many liberals since the days of Thoreau at Walden pond? See the movie Avatar, to see the ultimate liberal moral fantasy about “Eywa,” the god of nature, actually defeating the evil corporate plunderers (and the U.S. Marines as well). And see this essay by Ross Douthat, on the pantheism of Avatar.

Can anyone understand Avatar who lacks all intuitions of purity/sanctity?

–Jon Haidt

Posted in moral foundations | 21 Comments »
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Are Liberals and Conservatives Polar Opposites or Mirror Images?

February 21st, 2010 by Pete Ditto

In 1961, Psychologist Urie Bronfenbrenner coined the term mirror image perceptions to describe the similarities he observed in Americans’ and Soviets’ stereotypic views of one another.

Bronfenbrenner, writing during the height of Cold War tensions, noted that both sides in this grand ideological struggle tended to see their own leadership as good and nobly motivated and the other side’s leaders as corrupt and driven by malicious intent. Both Soviets and Americans perceived their own people as essentially peaceful with opinions free from governmental coercion, while seeing the other side’s people as aggressive and deluded by ideology and state sponsored (capitalist or communist) propaganda. Other researchers have gone on to note that this mirror image pattern, two opposing sides in an ideological struggle having virtually identical stereotypes of each other, is a common characteristic in intergroup relations.

It is hard not to see a similar dynamic playing out in contemporary America’s culture war struggle. If you take some time to read or watch each side’s partisan media voices, you should be struck quite quickly by the similarity of the charges each side levies against the other. The mirror metaphor is an apt one, however, as the image each side has of the other is usually similar but in a sense “reversed,” in that the accusations flow from each sides own unique moral sensibilities. Which generally means that both sides have to squint a bit to recognize their own visage in the other.

So for example, here are just a few places where liberals and conservatives hold eerily similar views of each other:

Both sides see the other as political extremists. It is common now in both political blogospheres to hear pundits bemoan the radical shift toward extremism in the other side. The right harps constantly on the “out of the mainstream” and “radical” left wing agenda pursued by President Obama and his cronies (read Reid & Pelosi) in Congress. Charges of socialism and worse abound. The left, on the other hand, sees a Republican party purged of any moderate influence and increasingly coalescing around a hard right economic (tea party) and foreign policy (neoconservative) consensus. The charges of choice here are “corporate apologist” and “war criminal”. Nazi references fly from both corners, and both sides accuse the other of trampling on their beloved Constitution.

Both sides see their own policy positions as motivated by national interest and the other side’s by crass political posturing. Democrats see Republicans as the “party of no”, devoid of any true policy convictions and driven only by their desire to see President Obama fail. Republicans, on the other hand, are fond of touting themselves as men and women of “principle” (particularly principled fiscal conservatism), and their increasingly populist rhetoric is a clear attempt to claim the mantle of the “voice of the people”. Democrats are portrayed by the right wing media as power hungry Machiavellians, motivated only by their desire to grow the government, raise your taxes, and thus solidify the power of the bureaucratic class and fat cat union bullies. Both left and right see their foreign policies as hard headed attempts to keep America safe, and the other side as willing to politicize terrorism policy for partisan advantage or in defense of some warped ideological aspiration (American exceptionalism or political correctness).

Both sides see their own policy positions as genuine and logical and the other’s as coerced and irrational. Both sides like to portray their own base’s opinions as grounded in “common sense,” and the other side’s as a product of cynical manipulation of popular sentiment orchestrated by political elites and bankrolled by partisan billionaire puppeteers. The epithet “kool-aid drinker” is hurled with equal frequency from the right and the left. Neither side sees criticism of the other side’s leaders as flowing from legitimate policy differences, but rather as a product of some irrational, emotional antipathy (racial prejudice or “Bush Derangement Syndrome”). Both sides tend to “psychologize” the other side’s opinions, and media figures seen as daring truth-tellers by their own side (e.g., Glenn Beck and Keith Olbermann) are seen as dangerously unhinged by the other.

Both sides see the other as fear mongering for political advantage. Throughout the Bush administration, Democrats accused Republicans of ginning up fear about terrorism to support neoconservative military ambitions and aggressive interrogation and detention policies against suspected enemy combatants. Now, Republicans accuse Democrats of engineering fear of global warming to support their radical environmentalist agenda, and of exaggerating claims of imminent economic collapse to support left-wing domestic policies. Both sides see their own fears as real, and the others as imagined.

Both sides see the other as politicizing science. Democrats celebrated the election of Barack Obama as a return to the rule of science after nearly a decade of repeated claims that Bush Administration officials were molding science to fit their ideological and religious beliefs. This point was made most prominently in regard to climate change science, but also about the use of data surrounding contraceptive use and endangered species protection. Republicans are now making remarkably similar claims of liberal scientific meddling, fueled by the release of a series of suspicious sounding emails from British climate change scientists (so-called “climategate”). Interestingly, a meme is now emerging in conservative circles arguing that liberals’ belief that global warming is “settled science,” and their refusal to acknowledge scientific data challenging their established beliefs, is itself an example of being blinded by pseudo-religious faith (see George Will’s recent Washington Post Column).

Both sides see the other as lacking bipartisan spirit. What more can one say? If it wasn’t quite so sad, we could all share a smile over the irony of two political factions so bitterly locked in a partisan battle that they respond to a public outcry for bipartisanship with dueling accusations of the other side’s lack thereof.

Mirror image perceptions are a hallmark of judgmental bias. When both sides hold virtually identical negative beliefs about each other, it suggests that there is very little “there”, there — and that the groups’ mutual (mis)perceptions are likely fueled by biases that arise from intergroup conflict.

Of course, when evaluating political speech one always has to work at separating out rhetoric (what elites say for strategic reasons but don’t really believe) from true belief (what people don’t just say but really believe, and what I as a psychologist am primarily interested in). In a subsequent blog entry, I plan to post some yourmorals data documenting left-right mirror image perceptions in our respondents. I will follow that with a series of posts discussing some of the psychological biases that I believe produce mirror image perceptions, and in turn fuel partisan mistrust and uncivil politics.

– Pete Ditto

Posted in civil politics, news commentary | 13 Comments »

Democrats and Republicans agree that Justice & Fairness are about Equity, not Equality or Impartiality

February 21st, 2010 by Ravi Iyer

I was browsing CNN today and I decided to expand my moral imagination by watching Glenn Beck Speak at the Conservative Political Action Committee meeting.  I was surprised how reasonable his message sounded to me, as my previous impression of him was not good.

I believe that people should be able to get what they deserve too. I don’t begrudge small businesses who succeed through hard work. I appreciate hard work as much as anyone. Does that mean that I should switch parties?

None of my posts would be complete without a graph, so I decided to look at some of our data on justice and fairness from yourmorals.org. Below is a graph of how various ideologies would view changing a hypothetical allocation of a reward from ambiguous toward the use of some specific type of justice or fairness.

Equity concerns giving more to those who contribute more.  Equality concerns making the distribution more equal.  Need concerns giving more to those who need it more. Open information concerns making sure everyone understands the process. Equal voice concerns allowing everyone an equal say in how to make the allocation. Retribution concerns giving less reward to those who violate some relevant group norm. Higher bars indicate that making a change toward that principle is more desirable.

Democrats Republicans Fairness Justice Equity Equality Need

What did I learn from this graph? Liberals do care more about equality and need than conservatives and conservatives do care more about equity and retribution.  However, both liberals and conservatives (and libertarians) find an equity based distribution (e.g. “Suppose the company instituted a way of quantifying each employee’s contributions, and it then adjusted the bonuses up or down accordingly”) to be more desirable to an equal distribution (e.g. “Suppose the company divided the money such that each employee received an equal share.“)  This somewhat captures how I feel about things.  I care about people getting what they deserve, but perhaps I am willing to consider equality and need in some situations as well.

Below is another graph using different participants, which concerns endorsement of abstract principles rather than hypothetical allocations and again, we see that the proportionality principle (e.g. “Whether or not those who contribute more are rewarded more”) is deemed most important.

The take home message for Democrats? Stop letting Republicans define policy as choices between equity and equality/need. Nobody will support trying to stop small businesses from succeeding…few people want a completely equal society.

Rather, let’s see if people are really getting what they deserve in life.  Do investment bankers really deserve million dollar bonuses?  I don’t think they necessarily produce much more than many, and obviously in the past few years, their collective output has been negative. So I see taxing banks to recoup losses as a matter of equity/proportionality, not equality.

How about the working poor who work hard and then are bankrupted by a single medical expense? What percentage of Americans actually make enough money to pay for a chronic illness? We all need health care that doesn’t go away when we get really sick and need to use it. Maybe health care isn’t a right in the minds of most Americans, but one could make an equity based argument for making sure the working poor have health care. Does Glenn Beck’s father, who owned a bakery and therefore would have immense trouble buying health care without a large risk pool, deserve health care less than those investment bankers who drove the economy into the ground with high risk derivatives?  If not, maybe there is an equity based argument to be made about that.

Democrats should welcome a debate about how to really give people what they deserve in life, rather than feeding the perception that they want to create a perfectly equal society. Republicans, on the other hand, are doing well to define themselves as the party of equity.

– Ravi Iyer

Posted in differences between republicans and democrats, equality, equity, fairness, functional justice, glenn beck, justice and fairness, news commentary, political psychology, proportionality, yourmorals.org | 4 Comments »

Religion does not cause racism, but group morality may underlie both.

February 17th, 2010 by Ravi Iyer

One of the professors at my university co-authored a recent meta-analysis which found that there is a relatively robust correlation between religiosity and racism.  It’s hard to dispute the methodology of the study, which included 55 studies with over 20,000 people.  Still, I can’t help but cringe at what take home message people might get from reading about this study.  I can see non-religious schadenfreude and religious defensiveness resulting from a simplistic assumption that correlation equals causality.

Religion does not cause racism, or at least that’s my contention.  My hypothesis is that the reason they are correlated is that some people who are naturally group oriented gravitate towards religion.  Other people who are group oriented gravitate towards racism.  There are a large number of things that being group oriented will lead one to gravitate towards….sports teams, the military, marching bands, boy scouts, etc..  Sometimes people who are group oriented will gravitate towards more than one of these groups and so it is not so surprising that we will see a correlation between racism and membership in any of these groups.

I cannot test this hypothesis directly, but I do have some evidence for this.  In their paper, they state that “In our meta-analytic review, the paradox of religious racism was traced to the group-oriented motives that underlie religiosity.”  From a moral foundation theory perspective, we would expect endorsement of the moral principles of Ingroup Loyalty and Authority to correspond to these group-oriented motives.  In our yourmorals.org dataset, we don’t have measures of racism, but we do have measures of a related construct, social dominance orientation, which concerns agreement to items like “Inferior groups should stay in their place.”

In our data, there is indeed a relationship between higher social dominance orientation scores and being Christian (most of the paper’s studies used Christians as their religious group).  However, when I control for moral foundation questionnaire scores on the Ingroup Loyalty and Authority dimensions, there is no difference between Christians and Atheists on social dominance orientation.  It is hard to visualize regression results which ‘control’ for other variables, but perhaps the below 2 graphs illustrate this point.  Basically, one can see that Christians and Atheists have very similar patterns of social dominance orientation at corresponding levels of group level moral concern.  The lines more or less overlap.

If there were a main effect of religious group, we would see the blue line consistently above the green line, indicating that at similar levels of group based moral concern, religious people are still higher on social dominance orientation.

Another way to look at the effect of religion is by self reported religious attendance.  Again, if we look at the simple relationship, there is a significant positive (Beta=.098) relationship between religious attendance and social dominance orientation.  However, if we control for moral foundation questionnaire scores, the relationship actually becomes negative (Beta=-.040, p=.005), indicating that at similar levels of group level moral concern, religious attendance is actually negatively related to social dominance orientation.

How real are these effects?  Will they replicate?  Our sample is not necessarily representative of the whole world and social dominance is perhaps a poor proxy for actual racism…but at least in this data set, there does seem to be support for the idea that group level morality explains all of the effects of religion on group level dominance, such that we might find similar effects between any cohesive group and racist attitudes, purely as a function of a desire for group cohesion.  All moral concerns are double edged swords and can be virtues (patriotic donations of blood after 9/11) or vices when hypermoralized (e.g. racism toward Middle Easterners after 9/11).  From this perspective, the fact that group cohesion and the hypermoralization of group cohesion co-occur is perhaps to be expected.

– Ravi Iyer

Posted in hypermoralism, political psychology, racism, religion, social dominance orientation, yourmorals.org | 4 Comments »

In politics, people don’t gravitate to the truth

February 15th, 2010 by Jonathan Haidt

In the NY Times, Feb 13 2010, p. A19, Charles Blow reports:

On Feb. 9, 2009, at the first prime-time press conference of his presidency, Obama said: “I am the eternal optimist. I think that over time people respond to–to civility and rational argument.” Since then, the right has tried to block him at nearly every turn, and the far right has formed a movement fueled by irrational anger.

[. . .] Yet, there he was again this week, a year to the day after the prime-time press conference, saying almost exactly the same thing: “I am just an eternal optimist. … And all I can do is just to keep on making the argument about what’s right for the country and assume that over time, people, regardless of party, regardless of their particular political positions, are going to gravitate towards the truth.” So stubbornly sweet. So simply naive.

If Obama is still clinging to this quaint concept after the year he’s had, it’s easy to understand why he’s in trouble.

From our perspective at YourMorals, Obama’s words sound so naive that we find it hard to believe he believes them. According to work by social psychologist Tom Gilovich (and backed up by a great deal of research on motivated reasoning), when people want to believe something, they ask themselves “can i believe it,” and the answer is nearly always yes. You can always find SOME evidence to support any conclusion, even if the preponderance of evidence points the other way. But when they don’t want to believe, they ask “MUST I believe it,” and the answer is nearly always no. Party and partisanship have enormous effects on what people believe. The truth has much less force. If Obama sincerely believes that the truth will defeat partisanship, then he is poorly equipped for life in politics.

But does he sincerely believe that, or was he just saying it because it suited his purpose at that moment during a conversation? Moral statements tend to be post-hoc rationalizations of what one has just said/did/judged, they are not honest reports of the real reasons why one said/did/judged, for such reports are not available for introspection or reporting. (See Tim Wilson, Strangers to ourselves)

–Jon Haidt

Posted in civil politics, news commentary | 1 Comment »

About the YourMorals Blog

February 14th, 2010 by Jonathan Haidt

There are thousands of blogs about political and moral issues, so why should you read ours? Because the main rule at the YourMorals Blog is that posts must explore or apply empirical research on moral psychology.

YourMorals.org is a collaboration among a group of social psychologists who conduct research on moral psychology and its applications to politics (see us here). We do this research in order to publish articles in the top academic journals. (See our publications here.) Our research findings often shed light on the controversies we read about in our morning newspapers, but the academic world moves slowly—it takes a year or two from the time we collect data to the time an article appears in a journal. We therefore created this blog as a way to apply research—our own and that of other social scientists—to current events.

Important Facts about this Blog:

–We strive to be non-partisan. Our goal is not to take sides or argue for liberal or conservative positions. Some posts may present liberals or conservatives in a bad (or good) light, but if you read many of our posts, or our academic articles, you will see that our goal is to help people understand each other across the political divide. (See our related project at Civilpolitics.org.) Of course, striving does not guarantee success, and because most of us lean liberal, it is inevitable that we will sometimes fail to present one side fully or fairly. We therefore welcome comments and criticisms, particularly from conservatives, to help illuminate our own biases so that we can do better research.

Each post is signed, and it reflects the opinion of the author(s), not the whole YourMorals team, unless it is signed by the whole team.

The Blog is available to any researcher working with Moral Foundations Theory, or with any other theory. Most postings are from our core group of six researchers, but we welcome guest postings from anyone who has collected data on moral and political psychology. Because, to repeat,

the main rule at the YourMorals Blog is that posts must explore or apply empirical research on moral psychology.

We hope you enjoy our blog, and we welcome your responses.

—Jonathan Haidt, Ravi Iyer, Pete Ditto, Jesse Graham, Sena Koleva, and Matt Motyl (i.e., the core YourMorals team)

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A Difference Between Democrats and Republicans – The Effects of Empathy on Political Interest

February 12th, 2010 by Ravi Iyer

Below is a simple little graph of yourmorals.org data that I thought would be worth posting.  Interest in politics is positively correlated with empathic concern in liberals/democrats and not in conservatives/republicans.  It’s somewhat self-evident in posts like this, or debates about the role of empathy from either the Democratic or Republican side.

Democrats could learn something from this graph.  Perhaps inspiring empathy in the electorate will motivate liberals to be politically active more than conservatives?  and how exactly might one appeal to empathy?  Perhaps by pushing poverty reduction programs, increases in foreign non-military aid, or putting a human face on health care reform?

empathy_self_interest_difference_republicans_democrats

btw, empathic concern is measured using Davis’ Interpersonal Reactivity Index which contains questions like “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.”  The next obvious step is to manipulate empathy and see if it has any impact on political behavior, or at least on the intention to engage in political behavior, as there is only so much that can be inferred from this correlation.  Still, it’s a promising research lead with interesting potential applications toward inspiring political interest.

– Ravi Iyer

Posted in conservatives, difference between democrats and republicans, differences between republicans and democrats, empathy, interest in politics, liberals, political behavior, political interest, political psychology, yourmorals.org | 9 Comments »
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